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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David Basil Mercer appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered upon
the district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction
relief.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2008, Mercer pled guilty to felony driving under the influence; the court
imposed a unified 10-year sentence, with five years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction.

(R., p.22.)

Following the jurisdictional review period, the court

placed Mercer on probation. (R., p.22.) Mercer later violated his probation and,
in 2013, the court revoked Mercer’s probation and ordered his sentence
executed. (R., p.22.) Mercer filed an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce his sentence,
which the court denied. (R., p.22.)
On appeal from the orders revoking probation and denying Rule 35 relief,
Mercer claimed the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and
denying his request for a reduced sentence. State v. Mercer, Docket No. 41068,
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 393 (Idaho App. Feb. 25, 2014). The Court of
Appeals rejected Mercer’s claims and affirmed. Id. The Remittitur issued on
March 19, 2014. (R., p.22.)
On October 30, 2014, Mercer filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief raising a variety of claims including a claim that he was “subject to double
jeopardy do [sic] to the fact [that he] did 30 days discretionary for resisting and
obstructing and then [sic] again was used against [him] for [a] probation
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violation.” (R., pp.5-15.) Mercer also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.
(R., pp.16-18.)
The district court issued a Notice of Intent to Partially Dismiss Claims
(“Notice”), notifying Mercer of its intent to dismiss the majority of the claims
Mercer alleged in his petition. (R., pp.21-26.) On the same date the court issued
its Notice, it entered an Order Appointing Counsel on Certain Claims. (R., pp.2829.) In particular, the court appointed counsel on Mercer’s claim that counsel
was ineffective during probation revocation proceedings and on his claim that
“the revocation of probation was a violation of double jeopardy because [Mercer]
had done discretionary time and then had his probation revoked for the same
conduct.” (R., pp.28-29 (bold omitted).)

Twenty-eight days after issuing its

Notice and appointing counsel, the court dismissed the claims that were the
subject of its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.35-40.)
With the assistance of counsel, Mercer filed a supplemental affidavit to
support his petition. (R., pp.57-59.) Although Mercer’s supplemental affidavit did
not specifically mention “double jeopardy,” he did assert that defense counsel did
not file a motion to dismiss “the allegation in the Motion for Probation Violation
that alleged the new charge of Resisting and Obstructing Officers,” noted he
“had previously been ordered discretionary jail time as a result of that new
charge,” and averred that he “believe[d] the court imposed [his] sentence
primarily relying on the new charge for which [he] had already been punished.”
(R., p.59 ¶ 9.)
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After Mercer filed his supplemental affidavit, the state filed an Answer (R.,
pp.67-69), and a separate motion for summary dismissal and supporting
memorandum (R., pp.70-71, 76-83).

The state specifically addressed, and

requested dismissal of, Mercer’s double jeopardy claim. (R., pp.82-83.) The
court held a hearing on the state’s motion on June 25, 2015. (See generally Tr.)
Following the summary dismissal hearing, the district court issued an
Order for Summary Dismissal and Notice of Intent to Dismiss Allegation 9
(“Order”).

(R., pp.146-157.)

In that Order, the court indicated the double

jeopardy issue “was previously dismissed by the Court in the Order Partially
Dismissing Claims.” (R., pp.151-152.) The district court subsequently entered
an order dismissing “Allegation 9” (R., pp.159-160), and entered a judgment of
dismissal (R., p.162), from which Mercer timely appealed (R., pp.166-169).
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ISSUE
Mercer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Mercer’s
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief because it erroneously believed
that it had already dismissed the double jeopardy claim?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Although Mercer is correct in his assertion that the record indicates the
district court erroneously believed it dismissed his double jeopardy claim in
conjunction with its Notice of Intent to Partially Dismiss Claims, is he incorrect in
his assertion that the district court’s erroneous belief requires reversal and
remand for consideration of a double jeopardy claim that fails as a matter of law?
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ARGUMENT
Mercer Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court’s
Judgment Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Mercer challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition

only on the basis that the district court erred in finding it had summarily
dismissed Mercer’s double jeopardy claim as part of its initial Notice.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-12.) The state agrees that the record supports a finding
that Mercer’s double jeopardy claim was not dismissed as part of the district
court’s initial Notice. Such a finding does not, however, require reversal for two
reasons.

First, Mercer’s complaint about the district court’s erroneous belief

could and should have been raised to the district court in response to the order
of dismissal. Second, even if Mercer was not required to raise the issue below,
this Court may affirm the denial of relief on Mercer’s double jeopardy claim
because the claim fails as a matter of law, and Mercer received notice of this
defect in the state’s request for summary dismissal. Mercer has failed to show
any basis for relief on appeal.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).
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C.

Mercer Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court’s
Judgment Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative. “To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
Mercer’s double jeopardy claim is based on his assertion that double
jeopardy prevents a court from imposing discretionary jail time for conduct that
constitutes a probation violation and subsequently revoking probation based on
that same conduct.

(R., pp.7-8, 59.)

In its initial Notice, the district court

acknowledged Mercer’s double jeopardy claim, but did not state its intent to
dismiss this claim. (R., pp.25-26) In fact, in its order appointing counsel, the
district court specifically identified Mercer’s double jeopardy claim as one of the
claims for which counsel was appointed. (R., pp.28-29.) The Order Partially
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Dismissing Claims was consistent with the court’s Notice and did not purport to
1
dismiss Mercer’s double jeopardy claim. (R., pp.39-40.)

Because the district court did not dismiss Mercer’s double jeopardy claim,
Mercer included an allegation relevant to that claim in his supplemental affidavit.
(R., p.59 ¶ 9.) The state also addressed the claim in its request for summary
dismissal. (R., pp.82-83.) However, in the Order the court entered after the
summary dismissal hearing, the court noted the double jeopardy claim was
referenced in both the state’s motion and Mercer’s supplemental affidavit, but
stated “this issue was previously dismissed by the Court in the Order Partially
Dismissing Claims.” (R., p.152.) Mercer correctly argues that the district court
was incorrect in this regard, and asks this Court to “vacate the judgment, and
remand the case for consideration of the double jeopardy claim.” (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.9-12.) Mercer’s request for relief should be denied for two reasons.
First, Mercer could, and should, have made his request for relief to the
district court. See Rule I.R.C.P. 52(b) (“No party may assign as error the lack of
findings unless the party raised such issue to the trial court by an appropriate
motion.”). When the district court entered its Order and incorrectly stated it had
previously dismissed the double jeopardy claim, it also entered a notice of intent
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Like the Notice, the Order Partially Dismissing Claims noted the double
jeopardy claim, but the double jeopardy claim was not included in the Conclusion
section of the order, which outlined the dismissed claims. (R., pp.39-40.)
Further, the double jeopardy claim was referenced in conjunction with a number
of other claims, which the district court dismissed because the claims had
“already been litigated on appeal.” (R., pp.39-40.) Since Mercer did not litigate a
double jeopardy claim in his prior appeal, this could not have been a reason for
dismissing the claim in post-conviction.
7

to dismiss “Allegation 9” and gave Mercer 20 days to respond to dismissal of that
allegation. (R., pp.156-157.) Mercer did not file a response. (See R., p.159.)
While the 20-day response time applied to Allegation 9, Mercer could have
responded to the court’s Order during that timeframe and advised the court of its
error in relation to the double jeopardy claim rather than raise his complaint for
the first time on appeal. Mercer failed to do so and should be precluded from
raising the complaint for the first time on appeal. Cf. DeRushe v. State, 146
Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2008) (post-conviction petitioner cannot
challenge lack of specificity in notice for the first time on appeal); Caldwell v.
State, 159 Idaho 233, 358 P.3d 794, 802-803 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing I.R.C.P.
52(b) in conjunction with rejecting petitioner’s request for “remand and a new
evidentiary hearing” because district court failed to address a claim in its findings
of fact and conclusions of law).
Even if it is proper for Mercer to complain about the district court’s
mistaken belief regarding the dismissal of his double jeopardy claim for the first
time on appeal, there is no need to vacate the district court’s judgment
dismissing Mercer’s petition and remand this case because the claim fails as a
matter of law.
There are three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy
Clause: protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3)
multiple punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415
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(1980) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes
omitted)). As noted in the state’s request for summary dismissal,
Revocation of probation constitutes neither a multiple trial
nor a multiple punishment; it does not involve a new trial to
consider the guilt or innocence of matters already decided, and it
does not involve an additional punishment, because the revocation
of probation involves only the enforcement of conditions already
imposed.
(R., pp.82-83 (quoting State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 155, 721 P.2d 1248,
1254 (1986).) Similarly, and as also noted in the state’s request for summary
dismissal, in State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 292 P.3d 258 (2012), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that discretionary jail time and the revocation of probation
based on the same conduct does not violate due process. (R., p.83.)
Given the limited scope of the double jeopardy clause, and the Idaho
Supreme Court’s opinions in Chapman and Scraggins, there is no legal basis for
Mercer’s double jeopardy claim.

Indeed, Mercer failed to provide any legal

authority to support his double jeopardy claim in response to the state’s motion
for summary dismissal, and he has failed to do so on appeal. Because Mercer’s
double jeopardy claim is not legally cognizable, this Court may affirm the
judgment dismissing Mercer’s post-conviction petition without remanding for
further consideration of that claim. This result is consistent with the Court of
Appeals’ opinion in Caldwell, supra.
In Caldwell, the petitioner claimed on appeal that the district court erred by
failing to address the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim he
alleged in his post-conviction petition. 159 Idaho at ___, 358 P.3d at 801. The
petitioner acknowledged he did not raise his complaint to the district court. Id.
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The state asserted that the district court’s failure to address the claim was
“immaterial” because an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim is
not cognizable under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Id. The Court
of Appeals agreed and concluded, “even if the district court had addressed this
claim, dismissal would have been the only appropriate action.” Id. at ___, 358
P.3d at 802. See also Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930
(2010) (“Because this Court employs the same standards on appellate review
that the trial court applies in considering summary dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief, if [the petitioner] failed to provide admissible evidence
supporting [his] claims, they were properly dismissed.”).
As in Caldwell, dismissal of Mercer’s double jeopardy claim is the only
appropriate action.

Accordingly, Mercer has failed to show any basis for

reversing the district court’s judgment and “remand[ing] the case for
consideration of the double jeopardy claim.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment
dismissing Mercer’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2016.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of May, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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